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 Abstract 
Conditional cash transfer (CCT) programmes have rapidly expanded throughout the 
developing world. These programmes have been relatively effective at improving living 
standards and producing behavioural changes expected to improve human capital among 
beneficiary children. Little is known, however, about the effect of CCTs on outcomes 
other than those they intend to modify but which may nonetheless be important for 
achieving these programmes’ longer-term objectives and improving development 
prospects more generally. This paper addresses this gap by evaluating the effects of CCTs 
on membership in social organisations and trust in institutions, using evidence from Peru’s 
Juntos programme. The analysis employs household- and district-level data and a 
difference-in-differences strategy to estimate the programme effects, focusing on the 133 
districts in which the programme was implemented during 2006. Its effects among both 
eligible and non-eligible households are estimated. The programme does not have effects 
on membership in social organisations on either group of households. It increases trust in 
institutions related to programme conditions among the eligible population, but it 
decreases trust in the ombudsman’s office, a public institution that has channelled 
grievances arising from exclusion from the programme. While the results regarding 
eligible households are encouraging news for proponents, those pertaining to non-eligible 
households reveal a negative unintended consequence that should be a source of concern. 
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1 Introduction 
Since they were first introduced in Brazil and Mexico in the 1990s, conditional cash 
transfer (CCT) programmes have quickly expanded throughout the developing world, 
especially in Latin America and the Caribbean. These programmes give cash payments to 
poor households under the condition that they comply with a set of requirements aimed at 
developing their children’s human capital, such as attending school, receiving 
vaccinations, and getting regular health check-ups. In this way, CCTs seek to reduce 
poverty while also attempting to break its inter-generational transmission. 
Many studies have shown that CCTs have been effective at reducing poverty as well as at 
inducing behavioural changes expected to improve children’s human capital, especially 
when it comes to education (e.g., Bourguignon / Ferreira / Leite 2003; Rawlings / Rubio 
2005; Schady / Araujo 2008; Stampini / Tornarolli 2012). In addition, there is some 
preliminary evidence suggesting that CCTs may also have longer-term positive impacts on 
income or economic vulnerability.1 Despite all the scholarly interest that CCTs have 
generated, little is known about the effects they may have on outcomes other than those 
directly linked to the programmes’ outcomes of interest, but that may nonetheless be 
important for achieving these programmes’ longer-term objectives and improving 
development prospects, more generally. 
In particular, there is a dearth of studies analysing CCTs’ social and political effects. 
Social effects have only been explored by a few studies based on in-depth interviews and 
focus groups (e.g., Adato 2000; Adato / Roopnaraine 2004; Huber et al. 2009). These 
studies document that targeting of CCTs can have divisive consequences in close-knit, 
poverty-stricken communities. Although initial division between beneficiaries and non-
beneficiaries sometimes gives way to solidarity between them, overall these studies 
suggest a bleak future for social ties that cut across eligibility lines. They do, however, 
offer optimism regarding CCT programmes’ potential to enhance social engagement 
among beneficiaries. 
When it comes to political effects, existing studies have focused on turnout and electoral 
preferences (e.g., De La O 2013; Zucco 2013). State–society relations have been 
neglected, despite good reasons to expect CCT programmes to have consequences in this 
regard by providing benefits to citizens who are mostly neglected by traditional social 
protection systems. Yet, any potential improvements in the links between the state and 
programme beneficiaries is likely to come at a cost, as a result of the exclusion of other 
citizens who consider themselves poor and deserving of assistance. Indeed, the above-
mentioned studies of the consequences of CCTs on social relations also document that 
targeting of CCT results in negative feelings among non-beneficiaries, although they do 
not explore whether more critical views of the state accompany these feelings. 
This paper addresses the identified gaps by evaluating the effects of Peru’s Programa 
Nacional de Apoyo a los más Pobres Juntos (National Programme to Support the Poorest 
Together; hereafter referred to as “Juntos”) on social engagement and trust in governmental 
and political institutions. The first outcome is important to the extent that it contributes to 
                                                 
1  See Fiszbein / Schady (2009, 123–124) for a review of this evidence. 
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social cohesion and the building up of individuals’ social capital stocks. As such, it can 
play an important role in enhancing welfare, helping the poor not only to get by in the 
short run, but also to overcome and stay out of poverty in the long run (Narayan 1999). 
Trust in governmental and political institutions is an indicator of the quality of state–
society relations. It is important for development prospects because it enhances 
governance by providing incumbents with leeway to enact long-term oriented policies, 
and making citizens more willing to comply with governmental demands and regulations 
(Gamson 1968; Levi 1998). 
The Juntos programme targets poor households in poor districts that have one or more 
children up to 14 years old or a pregnant woman. It imposes conditions related to identity 
registration, health, and education. The programme’s intent-to-treat (ITT) effects are 
estimated using household-level data from a national living standards measurement survey 
complemented with administrative records and a difference-in-differences strategy. The 
analysis focuses on a cohort of 133 districts in which the programme was implemented 
prior to or during 2006, and examines the programmes’ short-term effects among both 
eligible and non-eligible households. 
The results indicate that the programme had no effects on social engagement among either 
group of households. These findings suggest that fears of CCTs having negative 
consequences on intra-community relations as well as optimism regarding their potential 
to enhance social engagement may have been premature. The programme did have effects 
on trust. Among eligible households, it increased trust in government institutions directly 
related to conditions. Among non-eligible households, the programme resulted in 
decreases in trust in the ombudsman’s office, which channelled grievances arising from 
perceptions of unfairness in the selection of beneficiaries, but was not able to influence 
ultimate programme enrolment. While the results regarding eligible households are 
encouraging news for proponents, those pertaining to non-eligible households reveal a 
negative unintended consequence that should be a source of concern.  
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. The second section discusses 
theoretical expectations and available evidence about the effects of social programmes, in 
general, and conditional cash transfers, in particular, on social engagement and trust in 
institutions. The third section introduces the main characteristics of Juntos, including the 
targeting strategy the programme used to identify eligible households in its first years of 
operation. The data, estimation strategy, and outcome variables are discussed in the fourth 
section. The fifth section presents and discusses the results. The final section concludes 
with a summary of the findings and a discussion of their implications for theory and 
policy-making. 
2 Links between social programmes, social engagement, and trust in 
institutions 
At a general level, there are two opposing views about the consequences of social 
programmes on social engagement (Woolcock 1998, 156–158). On the one hand, it has 
been argued that the larger the welfare state, the less space there is for autonomous 
associations. Specifically, social programme expansion has been credited with crowding 
out mutual solidarity associations and undermining the reciprocity that they facilitate. On 
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the other hand, there is the view that welfare state enlargement has provided an ideal 
environment for new forms of associations to develop. In particular, social programmes 
provide resources and incentives that can result in the creation of organised interest groups 
(Pierson 1993). The evidence seems to side with the second view, with the proliferation of 
non-profits and voluntary associations set up to provide welfare services on behalf of the 
state, as well as organisations of service users and beneficiaries providing cases in point 
(e.g., Skocpol 1995; Salamon 1995). 
Evidence suggests that CCTs provide opportunities for beneficiaries to develop or 
strengthen ties among themselves. In the case of Mexico’s Progresa, for example, bonds 
between participants have been strengthened by participation in monthly meetings, health 
education talks, and community work activities (Adato 2000, 44–45). In the specific case 
of Juntos, one study indicates that mothers of beneficiary households tend to form 
organisations that provide opportunities for interaction as well as support for members in 
the event of unexpected shocks such as illness (Arroyo Laguna 2010, 73). Yet, these 
opportunities can be a double-edged sword for social ties: since participation is in most 
cases restricted to those receiving transfers, they can result in divisions across eligibility 
lines, severing ties between beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries within intervened 
communities. 
Indeed, the available evidence also suggests that targeting can have adverse effects on 
social engagement, especially in close-knit communities in which poverty is prevalent. 
Studies of Progresa and Nicaragua’s Red de Protección Social have documented 
sentiments of envy, resentment, and sadness among those not receiving subsidies, mostly 
because they consider themselves poor and deserving of government assistance (Adato 
2000; Adato / Roopnaraine 2004). These studies also report specific instances in which 
existing social ties have weakened, because beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries see 
themselves as having less in common, and non-beneficiaries refuse to take part in 
community activities. 
It is worth noting, however, that negative sentiments were not always directed toward 
transfer recipients, with non-beneficiaries often attributing their exclusion to bad luck and 
hoping to receive assistance in the future. In several of these cases, solidarity across 
groups was often also reported, with communities getting together to help those perceived 
of as needy but who had failed to qualify for the programme. This suggests that targeting 
and the subsequent response to it could also bring communities together and thus create 
opportunities for strengthening intra-community relations (Adato 2000, 26–30; Adato / 
Roopnaraine 2004, 78–79). 
Another important reason to expect CCTs to have negative effects on social engagements 
is that means testing often leads to the stigmatisation of programme participants by the 
general population as well by the non-beneficiaries in their communities.2 For example, 
beneficiaries of social assistance programmes are often viewed as lacking the will to get 
ahead without public assistance, or are thought to engage in legally or morally 
questionable strategies to qualify for programmes. Stigmatised individuals may not only 
                                                 
2  Goffman (1963, 3) defines stigma as an “attribute that is deeply discrediting” to individuals or groups 
of individuals and that reduces bearers from being “whole or usual” persons to being “tainted” or 
“discounted”. 
 Luis A. Camacho 
4 German Development Institute / Deutsches Institut für Entwicklungspolitik (DIE) 
be rejected or excluded from social interactions but also refrain from engaging others due 
to low self-esteem.3 In sum, stigmatisation can contribute to severing existing social ties 
and, perhaps more importantly, to hindering the development of new ones. 
Some evidence suggests that CCTs may indeed lead to the stigmatisation of beneficiaries. 
A study based on a nationally representative survey in Argentina finds that a large 
majority of the population thinks that beneficiaries of cash transfers “lie to receive a plan”, 
that “many of those who receive plans could find a job if they really wanted to”, and that 
plans lead to people “not going out to look for jobs”, “not knowing how to solve their 
problems”, and “becoming less prone to solidarity” (Cruces / Rovner 2008, 73–74).4 One 
study about Juntos documented the stigmatisation of beneficiaries in their own 
communities, identifying three “myths” that were prevalent among those not receiving 
transfers: beneficiaries “do not want to work anymore” and “become lazy”; women get 
pregnant to qualify for the programme or to remain enrolled; and beneficiaries do not use 
the transfers appropriately, spending them on alcohol (Huber et al. 2009, 100–101). 
Finally, it is worth noting that CCTs may have positive effects on social engagement via 
two additional routes. First, conditions imposed on beneficiaries can open additional 
opportunities for engagement, such as joining and participating in parent associations in 
schools. Second, increases in income (and social status) associated with transfers may 
result in higher engagement, given the positive association that has been documented 
between the two (e.g., Verba / Schlozman / Brady 1995). Beyond defraying the costs 
associated with membership or active participation in organisations, CCTs may have a 
positive effect by encouraging recipients to interact with others with whom they have had 
little or no prior contact or by increasing the demand for leisure activities. 
As in the case of social engagement, there are reasons to expect conditional cash transfers 
to have positive and negative effects on individuals’ trust in governmental and political 
institutions. Trust is considered to be the product of performance, although the connection 
between the two is not synchronic and likely flows in both directions: building trust 
requires sustained competent performance, while reservoirs of trust enable government to 
act more effectively and pursue long-term oriented policies (Hetherington 1998). 
Importantly, performance on its own is generally not enough to generate trust; to do so, it 
must be accompanied by the perception that government is acting in the interests of the 
people and following fair and impartial procedures (Levi 1998). 
In the case of social programmes, it has been argued that individuals are more likely to 
believe that they have received fair and equal treatment after interacting with 
                                                 
3  The stigmatisation of those receiving public assistance is a widespread phenomenon. In the United 
States, for example, Katz (1990) identifies two images of poverty that were constructed in that country 
in the 1970s and 1980s: single mothers and African-Americans living in inner-city ghettos. Public 
opinion easily labelled these groups as “undeserving poor”, because they appeared foreign to the rest of 
society. In Europe, several studies have also documented stigmatisation. In England, Spicker (1984) 
identifies various stigmas, including labelling those receiving public assistance as sick and 
incapacitated, mentally ill, and lacking morals. Colton et al. (1997) identify numerous stigmas 
attributed to mothers benefitting from social assistance programmes in England, Holland, and Spain. 
4  “Plan” is the term used by Argentines to refer to the various cash transfer and workfare programmes 
introduced in that country since the economic crisis of the early 2000s. 
The effects of conditional cash transfers on social engagement and trust in institutions 
German Development Institute / Deutsches Institut für Entwicklungspolitik (DIE) 5 
bureaucracies administering universal programmes. In turn, perceptions of fair and equal 
treatment not only increase trust in political and state institutions but also trust in others. 
This would not be the case with selective, targeted programmes because they leave room 
for bureaucratic discretion in determining eligibility, at least in the eyes of those applying 
for benefits (Kumlin / Rothstein 2005; Rothstein / Stolle 2008). Interacting with such 
programmes may lead individuals to believe that public service bureaucrats are not 
trustworthy and that those in need have to engage in questionable behaviour – e.g., 
cheating and distorting information – to make sure they get the benefits they feel entitled 
to (Kumlin / Rothstein 2005, 349). 
While this argument is clear about why one should expect universal programmes to 
increase trust more than selective programmes, it is not clear about whether the latter can 
be more beneficial for trust than no programmes at all. Selective programmes should have 
a positive effect on trust among beneficiaries because of the positive affect resulting from 
receiving government assistance and attention. This is even more likely in the case of 
CCTs, given that these target populations who have generally not benefited from social 
programmes in the past. This positive affect should offset any negative affect that may 
arise from observing that the programme has excluded other community members who are 
deserving of assistance. Among this last group, trust is likely to decrease as a result of 
feelings of exclusion. This is especially likely in the case of CCTs because they target 
communities in which all or most residents consider themselves to be poor. 
Although there is no evidence about the effects of CCTs on trust in governmental and 
political institutions, studies do report positive feelings as a result of inclusion in such 
programmes and the opposite as a result of exclusion. Feelings of gratitude toward 
government were reported among beneficiaries of the Juntos programme (Jones / Vargas / 
Villar 2007, 67). In the case of Progresa, non-beneficiaries were reported to blame the 
government – rather than beneficiaries – for not receiving subsidies and to complain about 
a lack of support and recognition from government (Adato 2000, 25, 38). 
Altogether, this discussion suggests that CCT programmes are likely to have differentiated 
effects among beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries in intervened communities. It is hard to 
make predictions about social engagement because there are good reasons to expect 
effects in both directions. First, targeting may sever ties between beneficiaries and non-
beneficiaries, but it could well result in increased solidarity and interaction across these 
groups. Second, stigmatisation could decrease social engagement opportunities for 
beneficiaries. Finally, arguments related to programme conditions and income increases 
suggest a positive effect on social engagement among beneficiaries. Expectations when it 
comes to trust in governmental and political institutions are clearer. CCTs are likely to 
have a positive effect among beneficiaries and a negative effect among non-beneficiaries. 
3 An overview of the Juntos programme 
Juntos targets poor households in poor districts with one or more children up to 14 years 
old or a pregnant woman. In exchange for a bimonthly monetary incentive of about 
 Luis A. Camacho 
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USD 78,5 beneficiary households commit to fulfilling a series of obligations related to 
identity, health, and education. The programme was introduced in 2005 and originally 
implemented in 70 districts. Since then, the geographical coverage of the programme has 
gradually expanded, reaching 1,011 districts by December of 2012. During the same 
period, the number of beneficiary households increased from 22,550 to 619,723 (Juntos 
2013a; Juntos 2013b). 
The programme selects eligible households in a two-stage process.6 First, “geographical 
targeting” selects districts to be intervened according to a “poverty index”. The first 
version of the index, which was used to select the initial 70 districts, combined the 
following four, equally weighted, indicators: (i) percentage of households with two or 
more unsatisfied basic needs; (ii) poverty gap; (iii) infant malnutrition rate; and, (iv) 
percentage of population settlements highly affected by political violence. This last 
indicator was included as one way to provide public compensation to communities 
affected by political violence during the 1980s and early-1990s. This index has been 
subsequently modified. The first change added one additional indicator to the index, the 
percentage of households living in extreme poverty, while continuing to weight all 
indicators equally. This version was used for the programme expansions in 2006, the 
cohort under study here. 
Once districts are selected, the programme implements the “individual targeting” stage to 
identify eligible households. The specifics of individual targeting have changed 
throughout the years. Up until the 2007–08 expansions, the process involved carrying out 
censuses in all selected districts. After identifying households that have one or more 
children up to 14 years old or a pregnant woman, the collected data were used to classify 
households according to whether they were poor or not. This classification relied on the 
results of a logit regression model estimating the probability of a household being poor. 
Using the estimated coefficients and the socioeconomic data collected in the censuses, a 
probability of being poor was predicted and used as a score to classify households. Those 
with a score below a certain threshold were considered eligible and enrolled in the 
programme. The idea behind this proxy means targeting strategy was to identify poor 
households by using easy-to-collect information about household composition, human 
capital, dwelling characteristics, and asset ownership – and thus avoid collecting income 
or expenditure data.7 
                                                 
5  As a reference, in 2006, the minimum wage was about USD 150 and the monthly GDP per capita was 
about USD 275. The transfer is thus quite sizable for Peru’s poorest households, which are the target 
group of the programme. 
6  For a detailed description of the selection process, see Linares García (2009). The ensuing discussion 
draws heavily from this source. 
7  The predictors of the probability of being poor were: (i) percentage of illiterate women in the 
household; (ii) percentage of members younger than 18 years old attending a regular educational course 
or programme; (iii) a dichotomous variable indicating whether the household has access to industrial 
fuels (gas, oil, and kerosene) for cooking; (iv) number of durable goods not available at home (out of 
predefined set); (v) number of public services (electricity, water, and sewage) available at home; and, 
(vi) a set of dichotomous variables identifying four categories of building materials used in the 
dwelling’s floors, walls, and ceilings. 
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The implementation model of the programme also involves community validation 
meetings in which lists of eligible households are presented to those in attendance in order 
to avoid inclusion or exclusion errors. Despite their well-intended objective of 
incorporating community input in the targeting process, validation meetings often create 
opportunities for conflict and division to emerge. Indeed, those left out often push for 
inclusion in the programme, leaving meetings with hard feelings when they fail to achieve 
this. Moreover, the input of communities sometimes is very limited – although local 
authorities and promoters of the programme do seem to have a say in the targeting process 
at this stage – with several validation meetings turning out to be events at which 
beneficiary lists are merely shared with the local population (Huber et al. 2009, 46–49, 
82–83). 
4 Empirical strategy 
The main source of data used is the Peruvian National Household Survey (ENAHO). The 
ENAHO is a nationally representative living standards measurement survey that collects 
information about household composition, income, and expenditures, and education and 
health status of household members, among other questions. It also contains items on 
membership in social organisations and trust in various institutions, which are used to 
construct the outcome variables for the analysis. The survey interviews about 20,000 
households every year and is carried out by the National Institute of Statistics and 
Informatics (INEI). These data are complemented with administrative records from the 
Juntos programme and the Ministry of Economics and Finance regarding the programme’s 
rollout dates by district and the index used for geographical targeting, respectively. 
4.1 Estimation 
The analysis estimates Juntos’s effects in Peru’s poorest districts, which are those in 
which the programme was first implemented. A difference-in-differences (DD) strategy is 
employed to estimate the intent-to-treat effect of the programme, that is, its effect among 
eligible households regardless of whether they were actually enrolled in the programme. 
The choice to estimate the ITT effect rather than the more common effect of the treatment 
on the treated is determined by data availability, as the ENAHO did not ask respondents 
whether they were Juntos beneficiaries during the first two years of the programme’s 
operation, which is the period under analysis here. A side advantage of estimating the ITT 
effect is that it guards effect estimates against selection bias due to unobservable 
characteristics at the household level.8 
                                                 
8  For example, households that enrolled in the programme might differ from other eligible households in 
that they possess motivations that predispose them or skills that enable them to participate. If this were 
the case, eligible households would not constitute a good counterfactual for enrolled households, and 
the effect of the programme would be overestimated. In theory, selection bias should not be a major 
concern in the case of Juntos given that enrolment in the programme within targeted districts was the 
product of censuses. In practice, however, it is a concern given that the censuses’ non-response rates 
were 35.2%, on average (Linares García 2009, 13). 
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Following Bertrand, Duflo, and Mullainathan (2004), the estimating equation for the 
model is: 
ijtjtjttjijt TY ενβτα ++++= ,      (1) 
where i indexes households, j indexes districts, and t indexes time; Yijt is a given outcome 
variable corresponding to household i in district j at time t; αj and τt are district and time-
period fixed effects, respectively; Tjt is a dichotomous variable that takes the value of one 
in districts intervened by Juntos for the period after the programme was rolled out and 
zero otherwise; νjt is a district-time-specific error; and εijt is a household-specific error. 
The coefficient of the treatment variable, β, is the DD estimate of the ITT effect of Juntos; 
it captures the change in the outcome variable among eligible households in intervened 
districts after the rollout of the programme. Note that the counterfactual in this comparison 
is the group of eligible households in non-intervened districts and that all non-eligible 
households are excluded from the analysis. 
A regression-adjusted version of Equation (1) can also be estimated to control for 
household-level characteristics and improve the precision of the estimates. In addition to 
the variables included therein, this specification adds a vector of observable household 
characteristics, Xijt, with its corresponding vector of parameters, δ. The resulting equation 
is the following: 
ijtjtijtjttjijt XTSC ενδβτα ++′+++= .     (2) 
Controlling for these observable household-level characteristics improves the precision of 
the estimate of β if these characteristics are correlated with Tj conditional on district and 
time fixed effects (Angrist / Krueger 1999, 1299). The controls included in the regressions 
below are an index of dwelling characteristics, an index of durable goods ownership, the 
head of household’s age and its square, the head of household’s year of schooling, and the 
number of household members.9 Estimation results for both Equation (1) and Equation (2) 
are reported below. 
The model’s parameters are estimated using ordinary least squares (OLS). Given that the 
district-time-specific errors cannot be estimated with this method, cluster-robust standard 
errors are computed to address clustering and heteroskedasticity. This correction performs 
well when the number of clusters is relatively high – about 50 or more, but no less than 30 
(Bertrand / Duflo / Mullainathan 2004; Cameron / Gelbach / Miller 2008) – as is the case 
here. 
As discussed in the previous section, it is likely that CCTs also have an effect on social 
engagement and trust in institutions among non-beneficiary households. The ITT effect of 
Juntos on this group is estimated using Equation (1) and Equation (2), but employing only 
the sample of non-eligible households. In this analysis, the treatment group comprises 
households in intervened districts, while the control group consists of households in non-
intervened districts. 
                                                 
9  Following Filmer and Pritchett (2001), the dwelling characteristics and durable goods ownership 
indices are expected to capture relative household wealth and are constructed using principal 
components analysis (PCA). 
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The analysis employs data from the 2004, 2005, and 2006 ENAHO surveys to estimate the 
effects of the programme in a cohort of 133 districts in which the programme was 
implemented prior to or during 2006. The focus on this single cohort of districts is 
motivated by two considerations. The first one is data availability. Given that the items 
gauging trust in institutions are available only from July 2004 onwards, the first twelve-
month period of (pre-treatment) data available is July 2004–June 2005. 
The other important consideration is identification. The key assumption to identify an 
effect using a DD strategy is that the over-time evolution of the variable of interest would 
have been the same in treated and non-treated districts had the treatment not been 
introduced – this is known as the common trends assumption. In the case of Juntos, one 
source of concern is that surveys conducted in the months immediately preceding rollout 
dates may have already captured some of the programme’s effects on social engagement 
and trust in institutions. This is because preparatory activities like censuses and validation 
meetings were taking place therein. To guard against this possibility, a six-month buffer 
period between pre-treatment and post-treatment data is established. This makes calendar 
year 2006 the first twelve-month period of post-treatment data available for estimating the 
programme’s effect. A second source of concern arises from the sequential 
implementation of the programme, as estimating effects for more than one cohort – or 
including more than a single cross-section of post-treatment data – would result in a 
decrease in the number of districts in the non-treated subsample and thus in a comparison 
of treated and non-treated districts that are progressively less similar. 
Finally, to make the common trends assumption more plausible, the sample of non-
intervened districts is restricted to the poorest ones according to the index used by the 
programme for geographical targeting. Only as many non-treated districts as needed to 
approximate the number of households in intervened districts are included. The final 
sample includes 133 treated and 101 non-treated districts. Treated districts comprise 2,827 
households (1,330 eligible and 1,497 non-eligible); non-treated districts, 2,805 households 
(1,441 eligible and 1,364 non-eligible). 
4.2 Outcome variables 
The ENAHO includes an item that asks respondents whether they or any other member of 
their household belongs to a list of 16 organisations. Social engagement is measured with 
two variables that indicate the number of organisations to which at least one household 
member belongs. These variables reflect membership in organisations that are more likely 
to facilitate horizontal ties and vertical ties, respectively. Horizontal ties refer to those 
established by individuals within the boundaries of any given community; vertical ties, to 
those that cut across these boundaries, integrating individuals with diverse backgrounds, 
life experiences, and interests.10 A list of the organisations included in each category is 
provided in the Annex. 
                                                 
10  Examples of organisations fostering horizontal ties would be those comprising individuals with similar 
economic status, place of origin, or religious creed. More encompassing collectives like peak unions 
and political parties would be examples of organisations fostering vertical ties. Whether a particular 
organisation fosters intra-community or inter-community ties is a relational matter, of course. All 
networks likely strengthen both types of ties to a certain degree. 
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This distinction is important because membership and participation in these organisations 
has been linked to the creation of different types of social capital. Bonding social capital is 
a product of horizontal ties and is particularly useful for the poor to get by, as it can 
provide resources for coping with everyday life and adverse economic shocks. Bridging 
social capital is a product of vertical ties and is essential for the poor to get ahead, as it can 
provide access to resources that are not available within poor communities (Woolcock 
1998, 167–175; Woolcock / Narayan 2000, 230–234).  
To measure trust in institutions, the survey asks respondents about the extent to which 
they trust several civil society, governmental, and political institutions. Responses to the 
trust items are recorded on a four-point scale that goes from “not at all” (0) to “a lot” (3). 
The programme’s effects on the following institutions are considered: (i) state institutions 
that Juntos’s beneficiaries are required to engage with due to conditions, namely the 
national office in charge of identity registration (RENIEC), the Ministry of Health and the 
Ministry of Education;11 (ii) the national ombudsman’s office (Defensoría del Pueblo); 
(iii) subnational governments (regional governments and municipalities); (iv) branches of 
government (legislative and judiciary); and, (v) political parties. 
Descriptive statistics for all outcome variables before and after programme 
implementation for eligible and non-eligible households in intervened and non-intervened 
districts are presented in Table 1. The table also presents descriptive statistics for the 
household-level controls included in the regression-adjusted estimations. 
5 Results 
5.1 The effects of Juntos on social engagement 
Figure 1 presents the estimates of Juntos’s effects on membership in horizontal and 
vertical social organisations among both eligible and non-eligible households. The full 
regression results are presented in the Annex. The figure depicts the point estimates of the 
DD estimate of the intent-to-treat effect from models with and without household-level 
controls (the β coefficients in Equation (1) and Equation (2), respectively) along with 95% 
confidence intervals. Whenever these intervals cross the vertical line at zero, the estimated 
effects are not significantly different from it. As the figure shows, the effects of the 
programme on membership in either type of social organisations among both eligible and 
non-eligible households are not significant. 
Despite good reasons to expect CCTs to have either positive or negative effects on social 
engagement among beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries, Juntos seems to have none. In 
turn, this finding can be interpreted in two ways that are not necessarily exclusive. First, it 
is possible that the specific effects associated with the various causal mechanisms cancel 
each other out to produce no overall effect. Indeed, as discussed earlier, targeting may sever 
ties between beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries, but it could well result in increased 
solidarity and interaction across these groups; stigmatisation could decrease social engage- 
                                                 
11  The prompt for the Ministry of Health also mentions public health clinics and hospitals; the one for the 
Ministry of Education, public schools. 
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ment opportunities for beneficiaries; and arguments related to programme conditions and 
income increases suggest a positive effect on social engagement among this group. 
A second possibility is that the results are the product of an inadequate measurement 
strategy. Specifically, formal membership in organisations could be a limited measure of 
social engagement in contexts characterised by poverty and in which most interactions 
may take place through informal channels. Given data limitations, employing more 
comprehensive strategies to identify the programmes’ specific effects through alternative 
mechanisms or to measure social engagement is precluded. 
5.2 The effect of Juntos on trust in institutions 
Figure 2 presents the estimates of the programme’s effects on trust in various gov-
ernmental and political institutions. As before, the full regression results are presented in 
the Annex. The programme has a positive and significant effect among eligible households 
on trust in institutions with which beneficiaries are required to engage due to 
 
Table 1: Descriptive statistics of outcome variables and household-level control covariates 
 
Source:  Own calculations using 2004, 2005, and 2006 ENAHOs 
No. Mean St. Dev. No. Mean St. Dev. No. Mean St. Dev. No. Mean St. Dev.
1. Elegible population
Number of organisations
Horizontal social organisations 671 0.03 0.18 643 0.02 0.14 696 0.10 0.31 732 0.10 0.31
Vertical social organisations 671 0.76 0.72 643 0.74 0.65 696 0.75 0.78 732 0.66 0.70
Trust in institutions
Institutions related to Juntos's conditions 617 1.41 0.71 575 1.43 0.67 660 1.60 0.70 671 1.48 0.68
National ombusdman's office 412 0.99 0.87 344 0.89 0.79 516 1.20 0.87 473 1.10 0.86
Political parties 520 0.54 0.72 509 0.47 0.65 618 0.61 0.75 618 0.58 0.69
Subnational goverments 585 0.94 0.73 557 0.96 0.68 649 1.00 0.70 644 0.98 0.71
Branches of government 558 0.81 0.74 502 0.76 0.70 614 0.89 0.73 618 0.83 0.71
Household-level controls
Index of dwelling characteristics 678 -1.83 0.84 652 -1.90 0.78 700 -2.02 0.75 741 -2.10 0.77
Index of durable goods ownership 676 -1.70 0.84 651 -1.85 0.74 697 -1.73 0.75 740 -1.71 0.88
Head of household's age 678 46.08 13.96 652 46.61 13.54 700 45.80 13.75 741 46.45 13.72
Head of household's years of schooling 678 3.61 3.50 652 3.32 3.58 700 3.93 3.70 741 3.85 3.63
Number of household members 678 5.70 2.03 652 5.74 2.08 700 6.21 2.30 741 5.98 2.20
2. Non-elegible population
Number of organisations
Horizontal social organisations 721 0.06 0.25 765 0.02 0.15 673 0.10 0.32 677 0.12 0.33
Vertical social organisations 721 0.50 0.67 765 0.49 0.63 673 0.63 0.70 677 0.56 0.70
Trust in institutions
Institutions related to Juntos's conditions 637 1.39 0.72 654 1.34 0.69 631 1.44 0.72 624 1.35 0.71
National ombusdman's office 475 1.10 0.90 455 0.87 0.81 489 1.10 0.88 467 1.07 0.88
Political parties 580 0.55 0.73 609 0.44 0.64 589 0.52 0.69 587 0.55 0.70
Subnational goverments 630 0.95 0.69 646 0.88 0.63 624 0.88 0.70 608 0.86 0.67
Branches of government 579 0.75 0.68 607 0.74 0.67 593 0.77 0.73 580 0.73 0.70
Household-level controls
Index of dwelling characteristics 724 -1.59 0.99 773 -1.69 1.04 679 -1.79 0.89 685 -1.82 0.88
Index of durable goods ownership 723 -1.49 1.18 773 -1.64 1.07 678 -1.54 1.01 683 -1.46 1.15
Head of household's age 724 50.80 18.00 773 51.47 17.67 679 49.32 17.01 685 48.71 17.32
Head of household's years of schooling 724 4.85 4.59 773 4.72 4.57 679 4.74 4.54 685 5.13 4.40
Number of household members 724 3.19 2.06 773 3.22 2.06 679 3.50 2.08 685 3.68 2.05
Intervened districts Non-intervened districts
Post-implementation Post-implementationPre-implementation Pre-implementation
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conditions: the national office in charge of identity registration, the Ministry of Health, and 
the Ministry of Education. The effect is robust to controlling for household-level 
covariates and it is also substantially important. Given that the pre-intervention mean trust 
in these institutions among the eligible was 1.41 points, the effect amounts to a 13.12% 
increase (according to the results from the model that includes household-level controls). 
The programme has no significant effects on trust in other institutions among eligible 
households. 
In the case of the non-eligible households, Juntos has a negative and significant effect on 
trust in the national ombudsman’s office, which is robust to controlling for household-
level covariates. According to the results from the model that includes control covariates, 
and given that the pre-intervention mean trust in this office among the non-eligible was 
1.10 points, the effect amounts to an 18.22% decrease. Negative feelings due to not being 
benefited by the programme are likely to begin the causal chain explaining this negative 
effect. These feelings may have in turn prompted them to file complaints against the 
programme through the ombudsman’s office, something that has indeed happened in the 
past (e.g., Defensoría del Pueblo 2011). Finally, animosity toward and distrust in this 
office may have resulted from its inability to enrol those who do not qualify for the 
programme. This result is particularly important because it provides support for the 
argument that targeting can lead citizens to have disappointing interactions with state 
institutions and to a corresponding decline in trust (Kumlin / Rothstein 2005; Rothstein / 
Stolle 2008).  
Figure 1: Effects of Juntos on membership in social organizations 
 
Source:  Own calculations using 2004, 2005, and 2006 ENAHOs 
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The programme has no significant effects on trust in other institutions among non-eligible 
households. Although not significant at conventional levels, effects on trust in political 
parties are worth discussing to the extent that they are substantially important and 
consistent with the argument that was just developed to explain the effect on trust in the 
ombudsman’s office. While the estimated effect from the model that includes household-
level control is only significant at the 86% level, it amounts to a 19.58% decrease in trust, 
given that the pre-intervention mean trust in this office among the non-eligible was 0.55 
points. This effect could again be attributed to targeting and the negative feelings it creates 
among this group. These may have been channelled not only into making complaints 
against the programme through the ombudsman’s office, but also into assigning blame to 
political parties for a perceived unjust situation. Politicians and parties are often the most 
recognisable actors associated with governmental institutions and they are also among the 
least trusted institutions. This makes them easy scapegoats for potential resentment arising 
from programme exclusion. 
In sum, Juntos has effects on trust in institutions with which beneficiaries and non-
beneficiaries have interacted as a consequence of programme implementation. In the case 
of beneficiaries, interactions with institutions required by the programme’s conditions can 
be presumed to be satisfactory and thus result in the creation of trust. In the case of 
beneficiaries, interactions with the ombudsman’s office are likely motivated by feelings of 
exclusion from the programme and result in diminished trust as a consequence of the 
Figure 2:  Effects of Juntos on trust in institutions 
 
Source:  Own calculations using 2004, 2005, and 2006 ENAHOs 
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office’s inability to change this situation. These findings support the argument that trust 
depends on actual performance as well as on whether governmental behaviour is perceived 
to follow fair and impartial procedures (Levi 1998); in this case, the payment of a cash 
transfer and the rules used to determine programme eligibility, respectively. Importantly, 
feelings toward these institutions or the programme itself have not been channelled toward 
more distant institutions, the only possible exception being political parties. This is likely 
due to the fact that those in contact with the programme view it as a very specific initiative 
of the incumbent government, rather than as a long-term oriented public policy. 
6 Conclusion 
CCTs have rapidly expanded throughout the developing world. These programmes have 
been relatively effective at improving living standards and producing behavioural changes 
expected to improve human capital among beneficiary children. However, to date, little is 
known about the effects of CCTs on outcomes beyond those that they intend to modify. 
This paper set out to explore the potential effect of Peru’s Juntos programme on two such 
outcomes: social engagement measured as membership in social organisations and trust in 
governmental and political institutions. 
The analysis shows that the programme has no effects on membership in social 
organisations among eligible or non-eligible households. The programme does, however, 
have a positive effect on trust in institutions with which beneficiaries are required to 
interact due to programme conditions among the eligible, as well as a negative effect on 
trust in the ombudsman’s office among the non-eligible. Juntos has no effects on trust in 
other institutions. 
Before discussing the implications of these findings, it is important to acknowledge some 
limitations of the analysis. First, given that the analysis examines a cohort of districts in 
which the programme was implemented at an early stage, and uses a single cross-section 
of post-treatment data, it is only able to identify the programmes’ short-term effects on 
households in the poorest districts. It is certainly possible that the programme may have 
different effects in the long run, or that the observed short-term effects only take place in 
very poor districts. A second limitation arises from the inability to analyse the specific 
effects associated with the various mechanisms linking CCTs and social engagement and 
to employ additional measures of social engagement or state–society relations. 
However limited, the analysis has at least three important implications. First, the results 
suggest that fears of CCTs having negative consequences on intra-community relations 
may have been premature. They also suggest that the stigmatisation of programme 
beneficiaries may be limited to rhetoric and not accompanied by their exclusion from 
social organisations. In addition, the findings do not support the arguments of sceptics of 
state expansion about social programmes crowding out mutual solidarity associations. 
While these are all positive news, it would have been more encouraging to find that the 
programme has positive consequences for social engagement, at least among its 
beneficiaries. 
Second, and perhaps more importantly, the paper indicates that CCTs have unintended 
consequences on trust in institutions with which households have to engage as a result of 
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the programme. While increases in trust provide additional reasons to justify and promote 
these programmes, decreases in trust should be a source of concern, especially in contexts 
like those in which CCTs are implemented, where trust is already low and links between 
the state and society are weak. In the specific case of Peru, decreases in trust in the state 
institution that is in charge of safeguarding citizens’ rights could be particularly damaging. 
Avoiding these negative unintended effects should be an additional consideration for 
policy makers and programme officials to weigh when making decision about targeting 
strategies. Echoing other studies’ recommendations (e.g., Adato 2000, 46–47; Adato / 
Roopnaraine 2004, 84–85; Huber et al. 2009, 106), abandoning household targeting within 
the poorest communities or adopting mechanisms to improve this procedure should be 
considered. 
Finally, the findings regarding trust in institutions provide evidence about the effects of 
government performance on state–society relations. They suggest that social programmes 
create opportunities for interaction between citizens and governmental institutions, which 
can in turn shape citizens’ views about these institutions. Whether or not these interactions 
translate into positive or negative assessments depends on actual performance – e.g., the 
payment of a cash transfer – as well as on whether observed governmental behaviour is 
perceived to adhere to principles of fairness and impartiality (Levi 1998). It remains to be 
seen whether CCTs can shape citizens’ views about institutions beyond those with which 
they have to interact or about the state as a whole. If anything, these more general effects 
are likely to materialise in the long run and only to the extent that citizens view these 
programmes as initiatives aimed at fulfilling the state’s end of the social contract. 
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Classification of organisations 
Bridging social organisations 
  Comités de gestión municipal (local community entities in charge of executing public 
works and projects funded with municipal funds) 
  Comités locales de administración de salud (non-profits that manage and operate state-
owned health clinics) 
  Mesas de concertación (dialogue roundtables formed to address grievances and solve 
conflicts involving local communities and other actors such as businesses or the national 
government) 
  Núcleos ejecutores (entities similar to the comités de gestión that spend national 
government funds instead of municipal monies) 
  Political groups or parties 
  Professional associations 
  Water users’ associations 
  Workers’ associations or unions 
Bonding social organisations 
  Comedores populares (community facilities comprising a kitchen and a dining hall) 
  Clubes de madres (community-based associations of mothers that provide services mostly 
related to childcare, including providing meals, both to members and non-members) 
  Cultural clubs 
  Neighborhood associations 
  Rondas campesinas (community-based policing organisations present in rural areas) 
  School parent associations 
  Sport clubs and associations 
  Vaso de leche (nutritional social programme distributing enriched milk to a primary target 
population of children up to six years old and pregnant mothers) 
Source:  Chiarella (2010, 61). Water users’ associations were reclassified into the bridging category 
while neighborhood associations were reclassified into the bonding category 
 
 
 
  
Full regression results 
    Horizontal     organisations 
Vertical          
organisations Juntos Institutions Ombudsman's office
Subantional 
government  
Branches of 
government Political parties 
                                 
                                 
    Without controls 
With 
controls 
Without 
controls 
With 
controls 
Without 
controls 
With 
controls 
Without 
controls 
With 
controls 
Without 
controls 
With 
controls  
Without 
controls 
With 
controls 
Without 
controls 
With 
controls 
                                 
                                 
1. Eligible population                              
  
Mean(αj) 
0.750*** 0.794*** 0.067*** -0,006 1.499*** 1.486*** 1.100*** 1.068*** 0.966*** 1.076***  0.842*** 0.998*** 0.568*** 0.902*** 
  (0,017) (0,161) (0,005) (0,047) (0,018) (0,165) (0,026) (0,235) (0,017) (0,161)  (0,018) (0,186) (0,017) (0,175) 
  
τt (Post-treatment=1) 
-0,066 -0,041 0,003 0,002 -0.122* -0.112* -0,125 -0,117 -0,006 -0,004  -0,059 -0,054 -0,026 -0,022 
  (0,043) (0,042) (0,016) (0,016) (0,050) (0,050) (0,072) (0,073) (0,050) (0,050)  (0,049) (0,050) (0,046) (0,046) 
  
Tjt (ITT effect; DID) 
0,057 0,025 -0,019 -0,014 0.196** 0.185* 0,105 0,098 0,053 0,054  0,055 0,050 -0,001 -0,005 
  (0,068) (0,065) (0,018) (0,018) (0,073) (0,073) (0,112) (0,112) (0,070) (0,069)  (0,077) (0,077) (0,068) (0,069) 
  Dwelling characteristics  
index 
-0.092** 0,012 0,049 0,040 0,045  0.073* 0,018 
  0,028  (0,010) (0,029) (0,043) (0,031)  (0,032) (0,033) 
  
Asset index -0,021 0.017* -0,042 -0,027 -0,015 
 -0,032 -0,003 
  (0,025) (0,008) (0,025) (0,032) (0,022)  (0,020) (0,026) 
  Age of household head -0.022*** 0.004* 0,001 -0,001 -0,001  -0,003 -0,014 
  (0,006) (0,002) (0,006) (0,009) (0,006)  (0,007) (0,008) 
  Squared age of household 
head 
0.000** 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000  0,000 0,000 
  (0,000) (0,000) (0,000) (0,000) (0,000)  (0,000) (0,000) 
  Education of household  
head (years) 
0,004 0.005** 0,006 0,009 0,002  -0,006 -0,004 
  (0,004) (0,002) (0,005) (0,006) (0,005)  (0,005) (0,005) 
  Number of household  
members 
0.060*** -0,003 0,007 0,007 -0,007  0,005 0,011 
  (0,007) (0,002) (0,007) (0,010) (0,006)  (0,008) (0,008) 
                                 
  
 
  Number of districts 233 233 233 233 232 232 224 224 232 232  231 231 230 230 
  Observations 2742 2739 2742 2739 2523 2520 1745 1742 2435 2432  2292 2289 2265 2262 
  R-squared (within) 0,002 0,061 0,001 0,018 0,006 0,011 0,004 0,007 0,001 0,003  0,001 0,005 0,000 0,004 
2. Non-eligible population                              
  
Mean(αj) 
0.565*** 0.831*** 0.078*** 0,000 1.427*** 1.516*** 1.101*** 0.956*** 0.915*** 0.954***  0.767*** 0.802*** 0.543*** 0.606*** 
  (0,015) (0,136) (0,006) (0,047) (0,019) (0,138) (0,023) (0,176) (0,016) (0,130)  0,016  (0,134) (0,018) (0,140) 
  
τt (T=1) 
-0,048 -0,061 0,014 0,009 -0.120* -0.124* -0,034 -0,034 -0,037 -0,038  -0,057 -0,060 0,003 -0,001 
  (0,041) (0,043) (0,021) (0,020) (0,051) (0,051) (0,064) (0,065) (0,050) (0,050)  (0,046) (0,047) (0,051) (0,052) 
  
Tjt (ITT effect) 
0,007 0,023 -0,043 -0,035 0,054 0,057 -0.194* -0.201* -0,005 -0,003  0,037 0,043 -0,116 -0,108 
  (0,057) (0,058) (0,023) (0,023) (0,075) (0,075) (0,094) (0,095) (0,066) (0,066)  (0,063) (0,064) (0,071) (0,071) 
  Dwelling characteristics  
index 
-0.055* 0.033** -0,018 0,005 0,007  -0,007 -0.066** 
  0,023  (0,011) (0,021) (0,032) (0,021)  (0,026) (0,024) 
  
Asset index -0,013 0.019* -0,014 -0,024 0,008 
 0,021 0,033 
  (0,019) (0,009) (0,016) (0,025) (0,014)  (0,015) (0,017) 
  Age of household head -0.024*** 0.003* -0,007 0,004 0,000  -0,004 -0,006 
  (0,004) (0,002) (0,005) (0,007) (0,005)  (0,005) (0,005) 
  Squared age of household 
head 
0.000*** 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000  0,000 0,000 
  (0,000) (0,000) (0,000) (0,000) (0,000)  (0,000) (0,000) 
  Education of household  
head (years) 
-0,003 0.009*** 0,006 0,006 -0,001  -0,001 0,000 
  (0,004) (0,002) (0,004) (0,006) (0,003)  (0,004) (0,004) 
  Number of household  
members 
0.087*** 0,000 0.026*** 0,009 0,004  0.016* 0,000 
  (0,007) (0,003) (0,007) (0,009) (0,006)  (0,007) (0,007) 
  Number of districts 234 234 234 234 233 233 226 226 232 232  231 231 231 231 
  Observations 2836 2835 2836 2835 2546 2546 1886 1886 2508 2508  2359 2359 2365 2365 
  R-squared (within) 0,001 0,102 0,002 0,065 0,005 0,030 0,010 0,013 0,001 0,002  0,001 0,005 0,004 0,008 
* prob < 0.05; ** prob<0.01; *** prob<0.001           
Source:  Own calculations using 2004, 2005, and 2006 ENAHOs.      
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